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Abstract
In this paper, we shed light on the nature of the interaction between an environmental
authority (EA) and the polluting sector in a developing country (DC) when there is uncertainty about
the relative weight that this EA places on public versus its own welfare. Within the context of this
general issue, we answer three specific questions for any arbitrary time period  First, we determine
the expected level of pollution as well as the actual pollution in the polluting sector. Second, we
compute the mean social loss arising in part from the uncertainty about the relative weight that the
EA places on public versus its own welfare. Finally, we solve for the optimal value of the parameter
which measures the relative weight the EA places on public versus its own welfare.
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3There is now a vast literature on the topic of sustainable development. For more on this literature, the reader should consult Atkinson
et al. (1997), Dwivedi (1997), Farmer and Randall (1997), Pezzey (1997), Heal (1998), Munasinghe (2007), and Stern (2007).
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See Batabyal (1998), Batabyal and Beladi (2002a), and Lee and Batabyal (2002) for a more detailed discussion of this point.
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1. Introduction
Since the publication of the now prominent Brundtland Report (Brundtland, (1987)), the
environment has loomed large in virtually every discussion of what it means for the process of
economic development to be sustainable. Although this notion of “sustainable development” now
quite often means different things to different individuals, there is little debate on the basic point that
the process of making economic development in the world’s low income countries sustainable is
fundamentally all about environmental protection.3
As Dwivedi and Khator (1995), Jan (1995), and Stoett (1995) have pointed out, in recent
times, many developing countries have adopted a number of measures to protect their environmental
resources. However, because stringent environmental measures often inflict “pain” on certain sectors
of a developing country’s (hereafter DC’s) economy, there is some concern among researchers and
observers about the ability of DC governments to carry through with meaningful environmental
policies. Put a little differently, because environmental protection and employment creation are often
competing objectives, the worry is that although DCs may initiate the process of instituting and
implementing environmental policies, over time, their faithfulness to such policies is likely to
diminish.4
Recently, Batabyal and Beladi (2002b) have studied some of these issues concerning the
conduct of environmental policy in DCs. Specifically, they pose and answer the following two
questions. First, when faced with a self-financing constraint, should an environmental authority (EA)
4raise/lower pollution taxes over time or should it run a deficit/surplus? Second, should an EA make
its preferences about the relative benefits of environmental protection versus production public, or
should it keep its preferences private? Batabyal and Beladi (2002b) show that when faced with a
self-financing constraint, it is optimal for the EA to run a deficit/surplus. Second, social losses are
lower when this EA keeps its preferences private.
Despite the presence of these useful findings in the extant literature, a question that has not
received adequate theoretical attention in the literature concerns the nature of the interaction
between an EA and the polluting sector in a DC when there is uncertainty about the relative weight
that this EA places on public versus its own welfare. Therefore, in this paper, we shed light on this
general issue. Further, within the context of this general issue, we answer three specific questions
for any arbitrary time period  First, we determine the expected and the actual levels of pollution
in the DC’s polluting sector. Second, we compute the mean social loss arising in part from the
uncertainty about the relative weight that the EA places on public versus its own welfare. Finally,
we solve for the optimal value of the parameter which measures the relative weight the EA places
on public versus its own welfare. 
Why is it important to analyze the general issue stated at the beginning of the previous
paragraph? This is because the actual practices associated with environmental policymaking in many
DCs suggest that this “public versus personal welfare” issue is salient. We now corroborate this
claim with some discussion of actual practices of environmental policymaking in two large and
important DCs, namely, China and India. 
1.1. China
In the case of China, the work of Sinkule and Ortolano (1995) tells us clearly that conflict
5of interest issues abound in the implementation of environmental policy. Consider the case of
Chinese environmental protection bureaus (EPBs). Sinkule and Ortolano (1995, p. 79) note that the
increased influence of EPBs may well “be offset by potential conflicts of interest that limit the
EPB’s ability to regulate.” Citing Qu Geping, a former administrator of the national environmental
protection agency (NEPA), Sinkule and Ortolano (1995, p. 178) emphasize “the importance of
preventing corruption and misuse of fees collected by environmental protection units...” These
authors also point out that very few EPBs are actually interested in seeing pollution discharge fees
being set equal to the cost of treating wastewater. This is because if these fees are set as they ought
to be set then factories will “respond by building more wastewater treatment plants, and then the
EPBs [will] lose fees as a source of revenue” (Sinkule and Ortolano, 1995, p. 180).
More recently, Michael Palmer (2000) has commented on environmental policymaking in
contemporary China. According to the revised Criminal Law, which came into effect on 1 October
1997, “officials responsible for supervising and managing the protection of the environment may
be liable for criminal punishment...for deviant acts committed in the course of duty” (Palmer, 2000,
p. 73). In addition, “[a]rticles 187 and 188 stipulate liability for maladministration and abuse of
power in relation, inter alia, to environmentally polluting conduct” (Palmer, 2000, p. 77). 
1.2. India
In India, environmental policymaking in general and the enforcement of environmental
regulations in particular leave a lot of room for improvement. For instance, in his detailed analysis
of environmental policies and regulations in India, Dwivedi (1997, p 99) points out that “the
administrative machinery set up to implement the [environmental] legislation interprets its own
duties from time to time, and such interpretations often do not conform to the...intent and purpose
5For more on the importance of credibility in environmental policy in DCs, see Batabyal (1998), Batabyal and Beladi (2002a, 2002b),
and Lee and Batabyal (2002).
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of the law.” In addition, although several meaningful environmental laws exist on the books, the fact
of the matter is that environmental degradation continues to quicken. This is because government
“bureaucrats and industry managers have a basically mistrustful relationship” (Dwivedi, 1997, p.
215). To make matters worse, this mistrustful relationship has “resulted in the inability of
government regulatory agencies to communicate candidly and freely with industry, and in industry’s
reluctance to seek joint industry-government solutions to industrial pollution-control problems”
(Dwivedi, 1997, p. 215).
At the level of environmental inspections, there is a considerable amount of corruption to
contend with. We learn that “environmental inspectors succumb to bribes partly because they are
poorly paid, partly because of the political culture prevailing in the nation and partly because the
punishment is not severe enough to deter them or the polluter. In other words, both inspectors and
polluters have an incentive to cheat” (Dwivedi, 1997, p. 127). This saturnine state of affairs has the
unfortunate effect of making bribery rampant in society. Indeed, bribery “is the best known means
of evading law enforcement, and when it is subtly employed it can be a useful delaying tactic for the
polluter” (Dwivedi, 1997, p. 204). Because of the reasons given in this and the preceding paragraph,
it is not unreasonable to contend, as Dwivedi and Vajpeyi (1995, p. 65) have, that environmental
regulators in India suffer “from the lack of political support and public credibility...”5
1.3. Discussion
This discussion of environmental policymaking in both China and India and our intuition
together tell us that there is really no reason to believe that an EA in a DC will only be interested in
7the welfare of the public. In fact, given the discussion in sections 1.1 and 1.2, what is more likely
is that as far as the implementation of environmental regulations is concerned, an EA will be
interested in both public and its own welfare. However, what relative weight an arbitrary EA will
place on public versus private welfare is typically not something that is known with certainty.
Therefore, in this paper, we suppose that this relative weight is a random variable. We now proceed
to study the nature of the interaction between an EA and the polluting sector in a DC when there is
uncertainty about the relative weight that this EA places on public versus its own welfare. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 delineates our stylized model of
the interaction between an EA of the sort described in the previous paragraph and the polluting
sector in an arbitrary DC and for an arbitrary time period  Section 2.2 ascertains the expected
pollution level and the actual pollution level in the DC’s polluting sector. Section 2.3 computes the
mean social loss arising in part from the uncertainty about the relative weight that our EA places on
public versus its own welfare. Section 2.4 calculates the optimal value of the parameter—portraying
the relative weight the EA places on public versus its own welfare—that minimizes the expected
social loss computed in section 2.3 above. Finally, section 3 concludes and offers suggestions for
future research on the subject of this paper.
2. Public Versus Personal Welfare
2.1. Preliminaries
As in Batabyal and Beladi (2002b), consider a trading DC whose economy is dualistic. One
sector is the traditional sector in which there is no pollution. The second sector is the modern or the
industrial sector in which production causes pollution. In the remainder of this paper, our attention
will be on this polluting sector. Further, the subscript  on a variable will refer to the time period
6As discussed in the previous paragraph,  and  are functionally related in a specific manner. Consequently, targeting pollution
directly has the effect of targeting output indirectly.
7
This kind of loss function has been used in the monetary economics literature by Barro and Gordon (1983), Backus and Driffil (1985),
and others. For a good account of dynamic consistency issues in monetary economics, see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, pp. 634-658).
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under consideration. Because we want to work with pollution in a time period,  directly as the
EA’s control variable, as in Batabyal and Beladi (2002b), we shall assume that the functional
relationship between the production of the polluting sector in time period  and the pollution
generated in this same time period,  is strictly monotonic. As in Batabyal and Beladi (2002b), we
would, once again, like to work with a loss function. Therefore, it will be helpful to think of the EA
as an entity that sets pollution levels (the bad) directly.
To reiterate,  is the period  pollution level that is set by the EA in our DC. Let  denote
the polluting sector’s period  expectation of what pollution will be in period  Assuming that
all agents in the polluting sector of our DC have rational expectations, we get  where 
is the expectation operator. There will generally be some discrepancy between the EA’s targeted
output level of the polluting good6 and the actual output level. To account for this, let  denote
the positive wedge between these two output levels. In addition, the production of the polluting good
may be subject to output supply shocks. To model this possibility, we let  be a conditional mean-
zero, independently and identically distributed (i.i.d) output supply shock. Finally, we suppose that
the EA’s preferences over pollution and the production of the polluting good can be described by
a loss function with the following form7
9(1)
The loss function in equation (1) is clearly the sum of three terms. The first term
 represents the EA’s concern for the output of the polluting good. The second term 
represents the EA’s concern for pollution. Finally, the third term  represents the EA’s concern
for its own welfare. The reader may find it useful to think of this third term  as a monetary
payment to the EA that is reduced when pollution increases. The parameter  in the second term 
measures the cost of pollution relative to that of suboptimal output. In the third term  
is a random variable that captures the relative weight our EA places on public versus its own welfare
(monetary payment). To keep the subsequent mathematics straightforward, we assume that
 and that the variance  In sum, equation (1) tells us that our EA wishes to
minimize the weighted sum of three terms that reflect its concern for the output of the polluting
good, pollution itself, and its own monetary payment or welfare. The outstanding task before us now
is to determine the expected and the actual pollution levels in the polluting sector of the DC under
consideration.
2.2. Expected and actual pollution
The reader should think of the interaction between the EA and the polluting sector in our DC
as a one-shot game. We now want to determine the equilibrium of this game. In symbols, we want




The first order necessary condition for an optimum to this problem is
(3)
Now, taking time period  expectations, setting  and then simplifying the resulting
expressions, we get
(4)
Equation (4) gives us the equilibrium expected level of pollution. Now, to obtain the equilibrium
actual level of pollution,  let us substitute the above value of  from equation (4) into equation
(3) and then solve the resulting expression for  keeping in mind that This gives us 
(5)
Recall that the random variable  captures the weight that our EA places on public
welfare versus its own welfare. Given this interpretation, equations (4) and (5) together describe the
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equilibrium of the one-shot game that we are analyzing. In addition, these two equations also tell
us that when there is uncertainty about an EA’s intentions as far as public versus private welfare is
concerned, the expected or mean amount of pollution is the same as when  is known to equal unity.
This conclusion follows because  However, the reader should note that the ex post
uncertainty about the type of EA that our polluting sector is confronted with creates additional
variability in the actual amount of pollution that arises. We now proceed to compute the mean social
loss arising in our DC in part from the uncertainty about the relative weight that our EA places on
public versus its own welfare. 
2.3. Mean social loss
To calculate the mean social loss in a straightforward manner, we shall make two
assumptions. In particular, we suppose that the relevant social loss function is of the form 
(6)
and that the covariance between the random variables  and  is zero or  Now, making
the appropriate substitutions from equations (4) and (5) into equation (6), we get
(7)
After several steps of algebra, the right hand side (RHS) of equation (7) can be simplified to
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(8)
where  and  are the variances of the random variables  and  respectively. Inspection of
equation (8) leads to three salient conclusions. First, as the parameter  which measures the cost
of pollution relative to that of suboptimal output increases, the expected loss to society decreases.
Second, as the uncertainty associated with the output supply shock  goes up, the mean loss to
society also goes up. Finally, when the uncertainty associated with the EA’s weight over public
versus its own welfare  increases, once again, the expected loss to society also increases. This
last result clearly tells us that from the standpoint of environmental policymaking, DCs need to
ensure, to the extent possible, that individuals who are placed in positions of authority are in fact
public spirited in the discharge of their official duties. The final task before us now is the calculation
of the optimal value of the parameter  which measures the relative weight the EA places on public
versus its own welfare (also see equation (1)).
2.4. The optimal value of the relative weight parameter 
Inspecting equation (8) it is clear that if there is no uncertainty about the relative weight the
EA places on public versus its own welfare, i.e., if  then the expected social loss is minimized
by choosing  In words, in this case of certainty about the EA’s type, the relative weight
parameter  is chosen so that it is equal to the positive wedge between the targeted output level of
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the polluting good and the actual output level of this same good. 
However, when  and hence  is unpredictable, the previous paragraph’s solution is not
optimal and we have to contend with the fact that there is a tradeoff between reducing mean
pollution by choosing a positive  and raising the variance of pollution because the EA’s
preferences are stochastic. Now, to determine the optimal  we solve
(9)
Differentiating equation (9) with respect to  and then setting the resulting expression equal to zero
gives us the first order necessary condition for an optimum to this problem. Algebraically
manipulating this first order condition gives us an expression for the optimal value of  and that
expression is
(10)
Equation (10) tells us that when there is additional uncertainty about the EA’s relative weight
 i.e., when  the optimal value of  is less than  the positive wedge between the targeted
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output level of the polluting good and the actual output level of this same good. Consistent with the
discussion in the first paragraph of this section, the reader can inspect equation (10) and thereby
easily verify that when  the optimal value of  equals the positive wedge  This completes
our discussion of the computation of the optimal value of the parameter  
3. Conclusions
In this paper we shed light on a hitherto unstudied question about the nature of the interaction
between an EA and the polluting sector in a DC when there is uncertainty about the relative weight
that this EA places on public versus its own welfare. First, in section 2.2 we determined the mean
and the actual pollution levels in the DC’s polluting sector. Next, in section 2.3 we computed the
mean social loss arising in part from the uncertainty about the relative weight that our EA places on
public versus its own welfare. Finally, in section 2.4 we calculated the optimal value of the
parameter—portraying the relative weight the EA places on public versus its own welfare—that
minimizes the expected social loss computed in section 2.3.
Recently, in the context of India, Dwivedi (1997) has noted that environmental policymaking
can be improved by, inter alia, increasing the public awareness of environmental problems and by
taking steps to mitigate the venality of officials responsible for environmental management. In
addition to having other benefits, these sorts of actions are also likely to diminish uncertainty about
an EA’s type. The analysis in this paper tells us that as far as the reduction of expected social losses
is concerned, taking the above sorts of actions would clearly be a good thing.
The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of different directions. In what
follows, we propose two possible extensions. First, one can generalize the analysis conducted here
by modeling and analyzing the interaction between an EA and the polluting sector of a DC as a
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repeated game. Second, with regard to the use of loss functions, it would be useful to study the
nature of the interaction between an EA and a DC’s polluting sector when the EA’s focus is not on
the minimization of social losses but instead on the maximization of the net benefit from the
implementation of sound environmental policy. Studies of the conduct of environmental policy in
DCs which incorporate these aspects of the problem into the analysis will provide richer accounts
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